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Abstract	
In	2005	in	the	Australian	state	of	Victoria,	significant	changes	were	made	to	the	defences	to	
homicide.	These	reforms	were	in	response	to	long	standing	concerns	about	the	gendered	
operation	 of	 provocation	 and	 self‐defence	 by	 feminist	 researchers	 and	 advocates,	 Law	
Reform	Commissions,	the	media	and	political	pressures.	This	paper	critically	examines	the	
reforms	and	the	extent	to	which	they	have	addressed	these	varied	concerns	and	interests.	
The	paper	argues	that	these	important	law	reforms	have	challenged	some	of	the	powerful	
narratives	being	used	in	the	courts	that	minimise	the	existence	and	significance	of	family	
violence	in	intimate	relationships.	We	see	this	particularly	in	judicial	sentencing	remarks.	
However,	 law	 reform	must	 be	 accompanied	 by	 a	 shift	 in	 legal	 culture	 to	 be	 effective	 in	
practice.	To	this	end,	we	argue	that	legal	professionals	need	to	have	information	about	how	
to	utilise	the	new	family	violence	provisions	as	well	as	ongoing	training	and	professional	
development	to	promote	consistent	understandings	of	family	violence	across	the	criminal	
justice	system.	
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Introduction	
Laws	on	homicide	have	conventionally	included	defences	which	either	completely	exonerate	the	
offender—for	 example,	 the	defence	 of	 self‐defence—or	 reduce	 the	 offender’s	 culpability	 from	
murder	to	a	lesser	form	of	homicide	such	as	manslaughter.	In	Australian	jurisdictions,	the	latter	
type	of	defence	has	included	the	partial	defences	of	provocation,	diminished	responsibility1	and	
excessive	self‐defence.		
	
The	Australian	state	of	Victoria	has	seen	a	series	of	significant	reforms	to	the	law	of	homicide	
aimed	at	addressing	long‐standing	criticisms	of	the	gendered	operation	of	these	defences.	There	
have	 been	 two	 key	 strands	 of	 concern:	 one	 focussed	 on	 men	 using	 the	 partial	 defence	 of	
provocation	to	excuse	their	actions	in	killing	their	partners	by	shifting	part	of	the	blame	onto	the	
deceased	 (usually	 a	woman)	 for	 her	own	death;	 and	 the	other	 on	women	who	kill	 to	protect	
themselves	from	serious	harm	or	death	in	the	context	of	on‐going	family	violence	but	have	not	
been	able	to	successfully	raise	self‐defence	where	appropriate.	Reforms	in	2005	reformulating	
self‐defence—mainly	 through	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 new	 offence	 of	 defensive	 homicide,	 and	
introducing	the	possibility	of	‘social	context’	evidence	of	family	violence	in	a	homicide	trial—and	
the	 2014	 reforms	 clarifying	 self‐defence	 and	 providing	 for	 jury	 directions	 on	 family	 violence		
seem	to	address	these	concerns.	They	are	also	symbolically	important	in	giving	explicit	attention	
to	 family	 violence	 to	 problematise	 the	 conventional	 legal	 formulations	 of	 murder	 and	 the	
defences	around	masculine	relationships	and	responses.	Indeed,	recent	research	examining	legal	
responses	to	women	and	men	charged	with	murder	for	killing	an	intimate	partner	since	2005	
indicate	that	the	reforms	are	making	a	difference	(Douglas	2012;	Tyson,	Kirkwood,	McKenzie	and	
Naylor	2015).	This	paper	considers	some	competing	indications	of	their	influence.	
	
The	 reforms	 both	 changed	 the	 substantive	 laws	 and	 introduced	 guidance	 to	make	 the	 family	
violence	 context	 explicit	 and	 relevant	 to	 the	 trial	 process.	 While	 changing	 law	 does	 not	
automatically	 change	 attitudes	 or	 practices,	 reformers	 hoped	 that	 the	 new	 laws	 would	
demonstrate	new	values	and	that	these	would	be	adopted	and	normalised	over	time.	
	
It	 is	 vital	 that	 reforms	 are	 monitored	 and	 evaluated.	 As	 this	 paper	 argues,	 the	 decision	 to	
implement	 the	2014	 reforms	and,	 specifically,	 to	abolish	defensive	homicide	 left	 little	 time	 to	
explore	 how	 the	 2005	 reforms	 were	 working	 in	 practice,	 particularly	 for	 women,	 given	 the	
(fortunately)	 relatively	 small	 number	 of	 homicide	 trials	 in	 Victoria.	 This	 paper	 outlines	 the	
evolution	of	 reforms	 to	 the	defences	 to	homicide,	particularly	 the	2005	and	2014	 reforms,	 as	
driven	by	gender‐focussed,	feminist	concerns.	It	then	evaluates	the	operation	of	the	reforms,	and	
concludes	that	the	substantial	legal	reforms	have	had	some	positive	impacts	but	clearly	are	still	
taking	time	to	influence	legal	practice	and	culture.	We	conclude	by	reflecting	on	how	to	better	
operationalise	these	significant	legal	changes.	
	
The	law	of	homicide		
The	defences	to	homicide	were	developed	at	common	law	in	the	context	of	provision	for	the	death	
penalty	for	murder.	Self‐defence,	for	example,	was	the	subject	of	numerous	cases	brought	before	
the	High	Court	of	Australia	which	resulted	in	the	establishment	of	the	terms	of	the	defence	as	
providing	for	a	complete	acquittal	where	the	person	used	reasonable	and	proportionate	force	in	
genuine	self‐defence	(see	Viro	v	R	(1978)	18	ALR	257;	Zecevic	v	DPP	(Vic)	(1987)	162	CLR	645).	
The	defence	of	provocation,	which	reduces	liability	(and	penalty)	from	murder	to	manslaughter	
where	the	person	lost	control	as	a	result	of	an	accepted	category	of	provocation	and	killed	whilst	
out	of	control,	was	the	subject	of	numerous	High	Court	cases,	from	R	v	Parker	(1963)	111	CLR	
610	 (ultimately	 appealed	 to	 the	 Privy	 Council)	 up	 to	 the	 currently	 accepted	 formulations	 of	
Stingel	v	R	(1990)	171	CLR	312	and	then	Masciantonio	v	R	(1995)	183	CLR	58.	
	
In	Australia	a	modified	version	of	self‐defence,	the	partial	defence	of	‘excessive	self‐defence’,	was	
developed	by	the	High	Court	to	provide	for	situations	where	the	accused	genuinely	believed	they	
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were	acting	in	self‐defence,	but	were	objectively	acting	unreasonably	or	disproportionately	(Viro	
v	R	(1978)	18	ALR	257).	This	partial	defence	was	abolished	by	the	High	Court	in	Zecevic	v	DPP	
(Vic)	(1987)	162	CLR	645	and	then	reintroduced	in	statutory	form	in	New	South	Wales	(NSW)	in	
s	421	of	the	Crimes	Act	1900	and	(briefly)	in	the	form	of	the	defensive	homicide	offence	in	Victoria	
(Vic)	in	s	9AD	of	the	Crimes	Act	1958.	
	
The	harsh	penalty	for	murder	provided	obvious	incentives	for	defendants	to	raise	defences	and	
for	these	to	be	fine‐tuned	by	courts	by	regular	analysis	on	appeal.	This	driver	persisted	even	when	
capital	punishment	was	abolished	in	many	jurisdictions	and	the	penalty	for	murder	was	instead	
a	mandatory	life	sentence.	Over	time,	jurisdictions	such	as	Victoria	(in	1986)	and	NSW	(in	1982)	
have	modified	the	sentence	for	murder	to	provide	for	judicial	discretion	in	sentencing.	This	has	
meant	 that	 potentially	 exculpatory	 factors	 motivating	 the	 killing	 can	 also	 be	 considered	 in	
sentencing.		
	
Reforms	to	homicide	laws	have,	therefore,	been	influenced	by	the	heavy	penalty	for	murder.	They	
have	also	been	influenced	by	changing	political	and	social	values	about	where	on	the	spectrum	
particular	harm	falls	and/or	whether,	and	to	what	extent,	particular	motivations	or	contexts	are	
acceptable	excuses	or	justifications	for	lethal	violence.	In	this	article,	changing	social	values	and	
critiques	of	homicide	defences	are	considered,	before	we	turn	to	the	specific	rationales	for	the	
2005	Victorian	legislative	reforms.	
	
Early	critiques	of	the	defences	to	homicide	
A	set	of	critiques	began	to	develop	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	as	part	of	the	broader	political	and	
social	critique	of	power	led	by	class,	race	and	gender	movements.	Critical	Legal	Studies	scholars	
exposed	the	underpinnings	of	 legal	decision‐making	 in	 terms	of	class	and	power.	Critiques	by	
feminists	and	critical	race	theorists	developed	these	insights,	beginning	from	the	feminist	work	
of,	 for	 example,	MacKinnon	 (1987,	 1989)	 in	 the	US,	 Smart	 (1989)	 in	 the	UK	and	Graycar	and	
Morgan	(1990)	in	Australia.	
	
At	the	same	time,	the	prevalence	of	violence	within	families	was	finally	being	acknowledged.	The	
previously	unquestioned	entitlement	of	men	to	control	women,	and	the	‘normality’	of	violence	
and	controlling	behaviours	towards	women,	began	to	be	challenged.	Identification	of	the	issue	
prioritised	 the	 collection	 of	 data,	 using	 crime	 and	 victim	 studies,	 to	 better	 understand	 the	
phenomenon	(see,	for	example,	Mugford	1989).		
	
In	Australia	 (as	 elsewhere),	 homicide	 laws	 and	 the	 accepted	 defences,	 therefore,	 came	under	
challenge	for	their	gendered	formulation	and	operation.	By	the	late	1980s	in	Victoria	and	other	
jurisdictions,	two	lines	of	critique	were	evolving.	One	focussed	on	the	types	of	male	violence	that	
were	‘minimised’	by	being	identified	as	less	culpable	through	the	existence	of	a	specific	defence.	
For	example,	the	defence	of	provocation	was	criticised	for	providing	an	excuse	for	men	reacting	
to	women’s	 rejection	 of	 them	 or	 to	 a	woman’s	 ‘infidelity’.	 The	 other	 focussed	 on	 the	 lack	 of	
defences	 available	 to	 women	 who	 killed.	 Homicides	 (like	 most	 offences)	 are	 predominantly	
committed	by	men,	who	commit	around	85	per	cent	of	homicide	offences	(Bryant	and	Cussen	
2015).	So	it	 is	not	surprising	that	critical	attention	focussed	first	on	cases	of	men	arguing	that	
their	violence	could	be	excused	or	 justified	on	 the	basis	of	 the	woman’s	 failure	 to	act	as	 they	
wished	 through	 defences	 such	 as	 provocation	 (Crofts	 and	 Loughnan	 2013;	 Law	 Reform	
Commission	of	Victoria	1991).	
	
However	with	 increasing	acknowledgement	of	domestic	violence,	and	some	high	profile	cases	
such	 as	 that	 of	 Heather	 Osland	 in	 Australia	 and	 Kiranjit	 Ahluwalia	 in	 the	 UK,	 attention	 then	
extended	both	in	Australia	and	internationally	to	women	committing	fatal	violence,	where	their	
victim	was	an	intimate	partner	who	was	violent	towards	them	(see	Osland	v	R	(1998)	197	CLR	
316;	R	v	Ahluwalia	[1992]	4	All	ER	889;	Women’s	Coalition	Against	Family	Violence	1994).	These	
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cases	demonstrated	that	the	conventional	defences	did	not	‘work’	for	or	reflect	the	lives	of	women	
in	the	way	they	did	for	men	(Morgan	2002;	Victoria	Law	Reform	Commission	2004).		
	
A	person	who	uses	violence	to	defend	themselves	against	a	threat	of	serious	violence	can	raise	
the	defence	of	self‐defence:	this	response	is	seen	as	justifiable.	The	defence	was	developed	in	the	
context	of	fights	between	men,	where	one	threatened	a	harm	so	serious	that	the	other	responded	
in	kind,	causing	death.	In	contrast,	women	who	were	in	a	violent	domestic	relationship,	and	who	
killed	their	violent	partner,	did	not	always	fit	the	traditional	paradigm.	Self‐defence	is	defined	in	
terms	of	the	necessity	and	proportionality	(or	reasonableness)	of	the	violent	response	to	a	threat.	
The	violence	these	women	faced	at	the	moment	when	they	killed	may	have	been	minor	or	their	
victim	may	have	been	drugged	by	the	perpetrator	or	asleep	(as	for	example	in	the	cases	of	Osland	
and	Ahluwalia).	They	may	have	used	weapons	where	their	partner’s	violence	was	with	use	of	his	
fists.	 Increasing	 understandings	 of	 the	 dynamics	 of	 violent	 domestic	 relations	 led	 to	 a	
reconceptualising	of	women’s	violent	responses	 in	some	of	 these	cases	as	being	 ‘self‐defence’:	
that	is,	they	faced	ongoing	threats	of	serious	violence	which	they	could	not	escape	without	killing	
the	 perpetrator	 (Stubbs	 and	 Tolmie	 1999).	 However,	 the	 formulation	 of	 the	 defence	 of	 self‐
defence	focussed	on	an	immediate	and	proportionate	reaction	to	an	equally	violent	threat,	and	
arguments	in	court	based	on	self‐defence	tended	to	be	unsuccessful.	
	
A	series	of	cases	in	Australia	and	elsewhere	tried	to	either	extend	the	concept	of	self‐defence,	or	
present	the	violent	relationship	within	the	paradigm	of	provocation,	by	arguing	that	the	woman’s	
psychological	reaction	to	being	in	a	violent	relationship	was	equivalent	to	that	of	a	man	arguing	
self‐defence	or	provocation	in	traditional	contexts	(for	example,	Osland	v	R	(1998)	197	CLR	316).	
A	difficulty	was	in	showing	that	the	family	violence	warranted	a	fatal	reaction	(whether	defensive	
or	provoked),	particularly	where	the	evidence	was	that	the	woman	had	continued	to	live	with	the	
violent	 partner.	 Psychological	 explanations	 termed	 ‘battered	 woman/wife	 syndrome’	 (BWS)	
were	used	to	argue	that,	for	the	woman	victim	of	domestic	violence,	a	syndrome	of	passivity	and	
helplessness	could	develop	which	prevented	her	from	being	able	to	leave,	but	from	which	she	
could	‘snap’	and	kill	(Stubbs	and	Tolmie	1999).	
	
BWS	was	raised	either	to	present	the	partner	violence	as	provocative	conduct	which	formed	the	
basis	for	a	provocation	defence,	or	to	make	the	woman’s	fatal	response	understandable	as	self‐
defence.2	BWS	was	subsequently	itself	criticised	as	pathologising	women’s	responses	to	family	
violence;	its	evidence‐base	was	also	extensively	challenged	(Douglas	2015).		
	
These	 concerns	 were	 first	 addressed	 in	 1991	 in	 a	 report	 on	 homicide	 by	 the	 Law	 Reform	
Commission	of	Victoria	(LRCV).	It	recognised	the	gendered	critique,	and	received	submissions	
from	women’s	 groups	 and	others,	most	of	which	 supported	 the	 retention	of	provocation.	The	
LRCV	recommended	retention	of	provocation,	stating	that	the	evidence	showed	that	juries	did	
not	 routinely	 accept	 men’s	 provocation	 arguments,	 and	 that	 it	 would	 be	 ‘ironic	 to	 abolish	
provocation’	when	recent	cases	had	begun	to	make	provocation	more	available	to	women	(1991:	
76).		
	
Reform	of	the	defences	to	homicide	in	Victoria	
By	 2000	 these	 gender‐based	 critiques	 were	 well	 established.	 At	 that	 time	 a	 newly‐elected	
government	re‐established	the	briefly‐disestablished	LRCV,	(renamed	the	Victorian	Law	Reform	
Commission	(VLRC)),	and	gave	the	VLRC	a	reference	to	review	all	defences	to	homicide.		
	
The	2005	reforms		
The	VLRC’s	recommendations	are	outlined	in	its	2004	report	and	were	implemented	through	the	
Crimes	 (Homicide)	 Act	 2005	 (Vic)	 with	 some	 modifications.	 The	 2005	 amendments	 included	
abolition	of	 the	defence	of	provocation	 (with	matters	of	 culpability	 such	as	provocation	 to	be	
taken	into	account,	if	at	all,	as	mitigation	at	sentencing),	the	clarification	and	codification	of	self‐
Bronwyn	Naylor,	Danielle	Tyson:	Reforming	Defences	to	Homicide	in	Victoria	
IJCJ&SD					76	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2017	6(3)	
defence	 (as	 a	 full	 defence),	 and	 provision	 for	 the	 introduction	 of	 expert	 evidence	 of	 family	
violence.	 In	 a	 significant	 modification	 of	 the	 VLRC	 recommendation,	 a	 proposed	 defence	 of	
excessive	self‐defence	was	re‐framed	as	a	new	offence	of	‘defensive	homicide’.		
	
The	provision	for	introducing	evidence	of	family	violence	was	developed	in	a	new	s	9AH	Crimes	
Act	1958	(Vic).	The	section	set	out	a	range	of	forms	of	 ‘family	violence	evidence’	that	could	be	
introduced	to	explain	how	family	violence	might	have	led	the	defendant	to	believe	that	their	fatal	
violence	was	necessary	and	reasonable	(s	9AH(3)).	It	also	stated	that,	where	family	violence	is	
alleged	in	a	homicide	prosecution,	a	belief	in	the	need	to	kill	in	self‐defence	can	be	raised	even	if	
the	response	is	not	immediate	or	the	use	of	force	is	excessive	(s	9AH(1)),	addressing	the	doctrinal	
hurdles	for	women	under	the	common	law	noted	above.		
	
The	 express	 provision	 for	 expert	 evidence	 on	 these	 matters	 addressed	 the	 evidentiary	
requirement	 that,	 to	be	 admissible	 in	 a	 trial,	 evidence	must	be	 legally	 ‘relevant’.	 The	 reforms	
explicitly	 permit	 introduction	 of	 evidence	 of	 circumstances	widely	 known	 to	 be	 important	 in	
understanding	 family	 violence	dynamics,	but	 traditionally	not	 seen	as	 legally	 ‘relevant’	 to	 the	
moment	 of	 killing.	 These	 include	 the	 cumulative	 effect	 of	 family	 violence	 (including	 its	
psychological	effect),	social,	cultural	and	economic	factors,	and	the	general	nature	and	dynamics	
of	family	violence	including	the	possible	consequences	of	separation.3	
	
Any	discussion	of	murder	and	defences	to	it	takes	place	in	the	shadow	of	the	lesser	offence	of	
manslaughter.	In	Victoria,	to	be	guilty	of	murder,	the	prosecution	must	prove	that	the	killing	was	
‘intentional’:	that	is,	the	defendant	either	intended	to	cause	death	or	grievous	bodily	harm	(gbh),	
or	was	reckless	as	to	causing	death/gbh	(Crabbe	1985).	A	killing	that	was	not	intentional	in	this	
way	but	resulted	from	an	unlawful	and	dangerous	act	or	from	gross	negligence	is	still	a	criminal	
offence,	but	 is	classified	as	 the	 lesser	offence	of	manslaughter,	with	a	maximum	penalty	of	20	
years.	This	means	that	a	person	who	argues	they	did	not	‘intend’	the	very	serious	level	of	harm	
may	either	be	acquitted,	or	convicted	of	manslaughter.	This	is	relevant	to	the	options	available	
both	to	defendants	deciding	whether	to	plead	guilty,	and	to	a	jury	at	trial,	as	will	be	seen	in	the	
discussion	 below.	 The	 2005	 reforms	 made	 self‐defence	 and	 the	 family	 violence	 provisions	
available	to	manslaughter	as	well	(s	9AE).	
	
Feminist	researchers	and	advocacy	groups,	media	and	government	were	monitoring	the	effect	of	
the	reforms.	By	2010,	at	 least	 two	patterns	were	emerging.	At	 the	time,	only	 two	women	had	
killed	a	violent	intimate	partner	since	the	reforms.	Neither	case	proceeded	to	trial	as	proceedings	
were	discontinued	on	the	basis	that	it	was	very	unlikely	that	the	jury	would	have	convicted	either	
women	on	the	evidence	(Victoria	Department	of	Justice	(VDoJ)	2010:	31‐32).	The	outcomes	in	
these	two	cases	were	seen	as	a	sign	that	the	reforms	were	working	for	women	defendants	(VDoJ	
2010:	29‐32).	Second,	a	substantial	number	of	men	who	had	killed	other	men	had	been	convicted	
of	defensive	homicide	either	as	a	result	of	a	plea	or	after	a	trial,	mainly	in	what	were	perceived	to	
be	one‐on‐one	‘spontaneous’	encounters	(VDoJ	2010:	33).	This	picture	was	seen	as	potentially	
problematic.	
	
The	2014	reforms	
In	2010	and	again	in	2013,	the	Victorian	government	launched	reviews	into	the	acceptability	of	
the	defensive	homicide	offence.	The	2010	review	was	prompted	by	concerns	over	how	the	law	
was	 operating	 in	 cases	 involving	men	who	killed	 their	 female	partners	 and,	 in	particular,	 the	
convictions	of	Anthony	Sherna	(DPP	v	Sherna	[2009]	VSC	526)	and	Luke	John	Middendorp	(R	v	
Middendorp	[2010]	VSC	202)	for	manslaughter	and	defensive	homicide,	respectively	(VDoJ	2010:	
10).	The	outcomes	in	these	two	cases	led	commentators	to	speculate	whether,	in	the	absence	of	
provocation,	defensive	homicide	had	simply	become	a	 replacement	excuse	 for	men’s	 violence	
against	women	(Capper	and	Crooks	2010:	21;	Howe	2010).	The	2010	review	was	put	on	hold	
following	a	change	in	government.	The	incoming	government	reiterated	these	concerns	with	the	
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operation	 of	 defensive	 homicide.	 In	 2013	 submissions	 were	 invited	 in	 response	 to	 a	 VDoJ	
consultation	paper,	which	proposed	abolition	of	defensive	homicide	on	the	ground	that	it	was	
being	‘inappropriately	…	relied	upon	by	men	who	kill	…	in	circumstances	which	are	very	similar	
to	 those	where	provocation	previously	 applied’.	 It	 found	 that	 ‘[t]he	price	 of	 having	 defensive	
homicide	for	the	comparatively	small	number	of	women	who	kill	is	substantially	outweighed	by	
the	cost	of	inappropriately	excusing	men	who	kill’	(VDoJ	2013:	viii‐ix).	
	
A	 substantial	 joint	 submission	by	DVRCV,	Monash	University,	 Federation	of	Community	Legal	
Centres	and	the	Victorian	Women’s	Trust	endorsed	by	14	women’s	advocacy	groups	challenged	
these	assumptions	and	argued	for	retention	of	defensive	homicide:	
	
Our	 starting	 point	 is	 that	 women	 who	 kill	 to	 protect	 themselves	 from	 family	
violence	 should	 have	 access	 to	 a	 full	 acquittal	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 self‐defence.	
However,	based	on	recent	research	that	examined	in	detail	cases	of	women	who	
have	killed	partners	since	the	2005	reforms,	we	do	not	yet	have	sufficient	evidence	
to	 show	 that	 self‐defence	 can	 readily	 be	 raised	 by	 female	 defendants	 at	 trial.	
(Domestic	Violence	Resource	Centre	Victoria,	Monash	University	et	al.	2013:	1‐2)4	
	
Nonetheless,	the	Crimes	Amendment	(Abolition	of	Defensive	Homicide)	Act	2014	(Vic)	came	into	
operation	on	9	September	2014.		
	
The	 most	 substantial	 change	 for	 present	 purposes	 was	 the	 foreshadowed	 removal	 of	 the	
defensive	 homicide	 offence,	 in	 s	 3	 of	 the	 amending	 act.	 The	 Minister	 stated	 that	 defensive	
homicide	 has	 ‘predominantly	 been	 relied	 on	 by	 men	 who	 have	 killed	 other	 men	 in	 violent	
confrontations,	 often	 with	 the	 use	 of	 a	 weapon	 and	 often	 involving	 the	 infliction	 of	 horrific	
injuries’,	which	had	led	to	‘justifiable	community	concern	that	the	law,	like	provocation	once	did,	
is	allowing	offenders	to	“get	away	with	murder”’	(Parliament	of	Victoria	2014).	
	
The	legislation	made	several	other	changes	including	shifting	all	the	provisions	to	a	different	part	
of	the	Crimes	Act	1958	(Vic)	with	consequential	renumbering;	self‐defence	was	also	reformulated	
to	require	a	belief	that	the	conduct	was	‘necessary	in	self‐defence’	(s	322K(2)(a))	and	the	conduct	
was	a	‘reasonable	response	in	the	circumstances	as	the	person	perceives	them’	(s	322K(2)(b))	
(rather	than	having	to	show	‘reasonable	grounds	for	the	belief’).	It	was	made	clear	that	a	person	
may	claim	to	have	acted	in	self‐defence,	for	example,	in	order	to	‘prevent	or	terminate	…	unlawful	
deprivation’	(s	322K	note	2),	a	scenario	which	has	previously	been	noted	as	potentially	relevant	
for	victims	of	family	violence.	The	application	of	the	defence	to	an	intoxicated	person	was	also	
clarified	(s	322T).	
	
The	potential	relevance	of	family	violence	to	self‐defence	was	developed	based	on	the	previous	s	
9AH,	with	the	concept	of	family	violence	now	being	defined	in	s	322J.	If	raised	in	an	argument	
based	on	self‐defence,	family	violence	evidence	is	stated	to	have	possible	relevance	both	to	issues	
of	 immediacy	 and	 proportionality	 of	 the	 action,	 and	 to	 both	 the	 subjective	 and	 the	 objective	
elements	of	the	defence	(s	322M).5		
	
To	facilitate	the	effectiveness	of	these	provisions	at	trial,	the	2014	amendments	also	provided	for	
directions	to	the	jury	on	how	family	violence	evidence	may	be	relevant	to	the	defences	of	self‐
defence	and	duress,	and	to	explain	the	scope	and	significance	of	family	violence.	For	example	the	
judge	 may	 explain	 that	 family	 violence	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 physical	 abuse;	 that	 people	 react	
differently	to	experiencing	family	violence;	and	that	it	is	not	uncommon	for	a	victim	to	stay	with	
the	abusive	partner	and	not	to	report	the	violence.	These	directions	were	incorporated	into	the	
Jury	Directions	Act	2013	(Vic)	in	ss	32(6)	and	32(7)	respectively	(now	ss	59	and	60	Jury	Directions	
Act	2015	(Vic)).		
	
Bronwyn	Naylor,	Danielle	Tyson:	Reforming	Defences	to	Homicide	in	Victoria	
IJCJ&SD					78	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2017	6(3)	
Not	surprisingly,	the	way	in	which	women	and	men	drew	on	the	law	reforms	of	2005	was	very	
different,	but	was	seen	as	raising	different	concerns.	These	are	considered	in	turn.	
	
Female	defendants	
In	2012,	a	team	of	researchers	from	the	Domestic	Violence	Resource	Centre	Victoria	(DVRCV),	
and	Monash	University	commenced	a	study	of	intimate	partner	homicides	committed	by	women	
and	prosecuted	in	Victoria	between	the	introduction	of	the	reforms	on	23	November	2005	and	1	
October	2013	(see	Kirkwood,	McKenzie	and	Tyson	2013).6	The	study	found	that,	although	the	
legislative	changes	provided	the	potential	for	progress,	there	had	been	limited	evidence	of	this	in	
practice	(Kirkwood	et	al.	2013;	see	also	Tyson	et	al.	2015;	Tyson,	Kirkwood	and	McKenzie	2016).	
	
Of	the	seven	cases	prosecuted,	there	was	a	history	of	family	violence	in	all	the	cases	(see	Kirkwood	
et	al.	2013:	14‐15),7	and	all	of	the	women	were	initially	charged	with	murder.	Three	pleaded	guilty	
to	manslaughter,	one	pleaded	guilty	 to	defensive	homicide,	 one	was	 found	guilty	of	defensive	
homicide,	and	one	was	found	guilty	at	trial	of	manslaughter.	The	study	concluded	that,	although	
the	women	were	more	likely	to	plead	guilty	to	manslaughter	or	defensive	homicide,	the	capacity	
to	 introduce	 a	 broader	 range	 of	 evidence	 on	 family	 violence	 was	 not	 being	 utilised	 by	 legal	
professionals	(Kirkwood	et	al.	2013:	39).	
	
The	new	provisions	in	s	9AH	envisaged	expert	evidence	on,	for	example,	the	‘general	nature	and	
dynamics’	of	family	violence	and	the	‘cumulative	effect’	of	such	violence,	from	general	experts	on	
family	violence	and	‘case	specific’	expert	evidence	to	contextualise	the	situation	of	the	accused	
within	the	framework	of	current	knowledge	of	 family	violence	(VLRC	2004:	141).	 In	the	cases	
analysed,	 the	only	expert	evidence	had	been	more	conventional	psychiatric	and	psychological	
assessments	of	the	women	(Kirkwood	et	al.	2013:	47).	
	
In	conclusion,	this	study	found	no	clear	indication	of	greater	readiness	on	the	part	of	the	legal	
professionals	to	recognise	a	family	violence	context	as	supportive	of	a	full	acquittal	on	the	basis	
of	self‐defence,	although	of	course	some	cases	may	not	in	themselves	have	necessarily	supported	
such	a	finding.	However,	there	is	evidence	that	some	of	these	cases	might	have	been	appropriate	
for	an	acquittal.8		
	
Two	areas	of	reform	warrant	more	detailed	discussion:	the	provision	for	context	or	‘framework’	
evidence;	and	the	abolition	of	defensive	homicide.	
	
Provision	for	context	evidence	
As	outlined	above,	the	reforms	introduced	provisions	stating	explicitly	that	evidence	of	 family	
violence	could	be	used	where	a	defendant	argued	that	they	acted	in	self‐defence	(Crimes	Act	1958	
(Vic)	ss	332M,	322J).	The	provisions	also	extended	the	operation	of	the	defence	of	self‐defence	by	
stating	that	a	person	could	argue	that	they	acted	in	self‐defence	where	they	were	facing	family	
violence,	even	if	they	did	not	act	 immediately,	and	even	if	their	actions	were,	on	the	face	of	 it,	
disproportionate	(Crimes	Act	1958	(Vic)	s	322M).	
	
The	reform	provisions,	therefore,	provided	that	evidence	about	family	violence	generally	can	be	
legally	‘relevant’.	It	was	unclear	whether	and	where	opinions	from	witnesses	about	the	general	
nature	of	family	violence	would	be	admitted.9	In	other	jurisdictions	there	has	been	debate	about	
whether	a	specific	provision	for	social	context	evidence	is	needed,	and	the	issue	has	led	to	debate	
within	individual	cases;	its	formulation	in	legislation,	therefore,	both	validates	it	and	serves	an	
explanatory	and	educative	function	(see	Douglas	2015:	98).	
	
As	the	VLRC	(2004:	xxxiv)	observed	in	recommending	this	reform:	
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Neither	the	honesty	of	the	accused’s	belief,	nor	the	reasonableness	of	the	accused’s	
action,	can	be	properly	evaluated	unless	the	jury	is	aware	of,	and	understands,	the	
broader	 context	 of	 violence	 between	 the	 accused	 and	 the	 deceased	 and	 the	
accused’s	situation.	
	
The	study	by	Kirkwood	et	al.	(2013)	emphasised	the	importance	of	social	context	evidence	not	
just	to	explain	the	situation	but	also	to	show	that	a	woman	may	kill	in	self‐defence	as	an	act	of	
agency	equivalent	to	that	of	the	traditional	male	defending	himself	against	an	assailant.	
	
The	Victorian	reform	provisions	also	encouraged	the	introduction	of	this	evidence	by	a	broader	
range	of	family	violence	experts	but,	until	recently,	the	use	of	the	family	violence	provisions	and	
introduction	of	social	context	evidence	has	been	limited.	A	review	of	Victorian	and	Queensland	
cases	by	Douglas	(2012:	377)	identified	the	continuing	impact	of	the	stereotypical	‘real’	battered	
woman	and	concluded	that	‘it	remains	very	difficult	for	battered	women	to	meet	the	threshold	
required	to	succeed	in	a	claim	of	self‐defence’.	Those	cases	resulting	in	an	acquittal	on	the	basis	
of	self‐defence	were	of	women	who	met	the	‘benchmark’	of	being	‘smaller	than	their	partners,	
white,	drug‐free,	monogamous	and	without	a	criminal	record’,	and	‘suffered	fierce	physical	abuse	
over	many	years’.10	Commentators	pointed	 to	a	 tendency	 for	cases	 to	emphasise	 the	woman’s	
behaviour	as	irrational	or	helpless,	more	in	line	with	a	BWS	analysis,	rather	than	as	a	‘rational’	or	
reasonable	response	to	the	situation	(Douglas	2015:	102;	Kirkwood	et	al.	2013:	45‐46;	Tyson	et	
al.	2016:	16).	
	
The	recent	cases	of	DPP	v	Bracken	[2014]	VSC	94	and	DPP	v	Williams	[2014]	VSC	304	were	the	
first	 to	 use	 the	 social	 context	 provisions	 (at	 that	 time	 s	 9AH)	 from	 different	 family	 violence	
experts.	Phillip	Bracken	was	acquitted	of	the	murder	of	his	female	partner	after	shooting	her	five	
times	with	a	 rifle	 at	point‐blank	 range	 (DPP	v	Bracken	 [2014]	VSC	94).	 In	Bracken	 it	was	not	
disputed	that	his	partner	suffered	from	several	serious	mental	health	issues,	regularly	verbally	
abused	him	and	sometimes	physically	abused	him	during	their	four‐year	relationship,	and	had	
threatened	Bracken	and	his	father	on	the	day	of	the	killing	(Collom	2015:	19).	Expert	evidence	
was	adduced	at	the	trial	by	a	forensic	psychiatrist	who	gave	general	and	specific	social	framework	
evidence	on	the	‘psychological	entrapment’	which	may	encourage	a	victim	to	stay	in	an	abusive	
relationship	(Collom	2015:	29).	The	approach	was	therefore	not	dissimilar	to	a	traditional	BWS	
case.	Soon	after,	Angela	Williams	was	charged	with	murder	after	she	killed	her	partner	by	hitting	
him	16	times	with	a	pick‐axe.	She	was	acquitted	of	murder	but	found	guilty	of	defensive	homicide	
(DPP	v	Williams	[2014]	VSC	304).	Williams	had	killed	her	partner	and	buried	his	body	in	2008;	
she	confessed	to	the	killing	four	years	later.	In	Williams	it	was	not	disputed	that	her	partner	was	
a	very	heavy	drinker,	frequent	marijuana	user	and	dealer,	and	was	the	dominant	controlling	party	
in	the	relationship,	that	he	frequently	verbally	abused	her,	occasionally	punched	or	kicked	holes	
in	the	wall	of	the	family	home,	and	had	a	long	history	of	inflicting	serious	violence	against	other	
people	(Collom	2015:	19‐20).	For	the	first	time	in	a	homicide	trial,	a	 law	professor	and	family	
violence	expert,	Professor	Patricia	Easteal,	gave	general	context	evidence	about	the	dynamics	of	
family	violence	and	the	ways	in	which	women	kill,	and	used	the	hostage	metaphor	to	describe	the	
psychological	 reasons	 why	women	 tend	 to	 stay	 with	 violent	 partners	 (Collom	 2015:	 30).	 An	
increasingly	 nuanced	 understanding	 of	 family	 violence	was	 evident	 in	 both	 cases.	 As	 Collom	
observed,	the	defence	in	Bracken	and	Williams	recognised	that	the	defendants	could	kill	in	self‐
defence	in	response	to:	(a)	non‐physical	forms	of	family	violence;	and	(b)	the	cumulative	impact	
that	the	family	violence	had	on	them	(Collom	2015:	21).	Indeed,	the	sentencing	judge	in	Williams	
observed	that	family	violence	can	be	‘belittling	and	controlling’	and	can	form	a	pattern	of	abuse	
that	may	 seem	minor	 on	 its	 own	but	 under	which	 the	 victim	 can	 reach	 a	 point	 of	 ‘explosive’	
violence	that	seems	‘disproportionate’	(DPP	v	Williams	[2014]	VSC	304	[26,	32]).	As	Douglas	put	
it,	this	approach	seems	to	have	been	‘strongly	influenced	by	s	9AH,	suggesting	the	provision	may	
be	having	an	educative	effect’	(2015:	106).	
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Abolition	of	defensive	homicide	
Defensive	homicide	was	introduced	to	provide	a	‘half	way	house’	for	defendants	found	to	have	
genuinely	believed	they	were	acting	in	self‐defence,	but	whose	assessment	of	the	need	to	defend	
themselves	was	found	not	to	be	objectively	reasonable.	It	was	abolished	in	2014	because	it	was	
seen	 as	being	 too	 readily	used	 by	men	 charged	with	killing	 other	men.	A	number	of	 feminist	
researchers	and	advocates	were	critical	of	the	proposal	to	abolish	defensive	homicide,	arguing	
that	it	provided	an	important	alternative	for	women	who	were	able	to	show	that	they	genuinely	
believed	they	faced	lethal	violence	but	where	the	jury	was	not	satisfied	that	the	belief	or	response	
was	reasonable	(DVRCV,	Monash	University	et	al.	2013;	Kirkwood	et	al.	2013;	Tyson	et	al.	2016).	
	
The	counter	argument	 is	 that	women	who	might	have	been	entitled	to	acquittal	may	be	more	
likely	to	plead	guilty	to	the	half‐way	offence	to	avoid	the	risk	of	a	trial	for	murder,	and	that	juries	
may	be	more	likely	to	convict	of	the	half‐way	offence	where	they	might	otherwise	have	acquitted,	
out	of	caution.	For	example,	Fitz‐Gibbon	argues	 that	both	men	and	women	risked	missing	the	
opportunity	for	a	full	acquittal	when	defensive	homicide	was	available	(2015:	132).	
	
These	arguments	continue	to	be	made	in	NSW	which	legislated	 for	excessive	self‐defence	as	a	
partial	defence	following	its	abolition	by	the	High	Court	in	Zecevic	v	DPP	(Vic)	(1987)	162	CLR	
645.	Indeed,	as	Toole	notes,	this	type	of	defence	has	been	‘in	and	out	of	favour	in	Australian	laws	
for	over	half	a	century’	(2013:	478).	The	debate	seems	to	be	between	principled	and	practical	
laws.	On	the	one	hand,	Fitz‐Gibbon	(2015:	138)	argues	persuasively	that	laws	(such	as	defensive	
homicide)	should	not	be	introduced	on	the	assumption	that	other	laws,	such	as	self‐defence,	will	
not	work	in	practice	for	women.	There	is	some	merit	in	adopting	such	a	principled	argument.	On	
the	other	hand,	this	may	disadvantage	individual	women	who	face	a	murder	conviction	if	they	
cannot	persuade	a	jury	of	both	limbs	of	self‐defence	as	a	result	of	gendered	stereotypes.	The	focus	
of	self‐defence	on	‘reasonableness’	highlights	continuing	challenges	for	some	women	to	show	that	
their	behaviour	was,	in	fact,	‘reasonable’	in	light	of	ongoing	limitations	in	understanding	of	the	
consequences	of	family	violence.	As	Tyson	et	al.	(2015:	92)	conclude,	‘[g]ender‐based	stereotypes	
continue	to	influence	perceptions	of	what	is	a	reasonable	response	in	the	circumstances’.		
	
We	do	not	have	to	resign	ourselves	to	such	stereotypes:	context	evidence	is	intended	to	reshape	
those	narratives	by	explaining	the	necessity	and	rationality	of	some	women’s	responses	to	family	
violence.	 Arguably,	 retaining	 defensive	 homicide	 and	 reviewing	 its	 operation	 in	 light	 of	 the	
educative	role	played	by	the	other	reforms	would	have	been	more	constructive.	Indeed,	as	King	
et	 al.	 have	 emphasised,	 the	Williams	 case	 ‘indicates	 that	 defensive	 homicide	 did	 operate	 as	
intended	…	as	a	safety	net	between	murder	and	an	outright	acquittal’	(2016:	175).	
	
Male	defendants	
As	already	explained,	the	2005	and	2014	reforms	were	driven	by	very	different	concerns	about	
women’s	and	men’s	killings	of	intimate	partners.	The	2014	reforms	were	primarily	a	response	to	
a	 perceived	 overuse	 of	 defensive	 homicide	 by	 men,	 which	 some	 believed	 had	 the	 effect	 of	
reintroducing	the	partial	defence	of	provocation	by	the	back	door	(for,	example,	see	Fitz‐Gibbon	
and	Pickering	2012).	Below	we	provide	a	brief	overview	of	the	defensive	homicide	convictions	
involving	men	who	killed	other	men	before	turning	to	a	discussion	of	cases	involving	men	who	
killed	 their	 intimate	 partners,	 and	 considering	 the	 accuracy	 of	 the	 government’s	 critique	 of	
defensive	homicide.	
	
Men	who	killed	men	
Between	2005	and	2014,	there	were	33	defensive	homicide	convictions;	27	of	these	involved	a	
male	perpetrator	who	killed	another	man	usually	in	the	context	of	a	violent	altercation,	and	20	of	
these	 were	 resolved	 by	 a	 guilty	 plea	 (Ulbrick,	 Flynn	 and	 Tyson	 2016:	 28‐34).	 The	 argument	
advanced	in	these	cases	was	that	the	defendant	feared	that	he	would	be	killed	or	seriously	injured,	
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and	so	killed	to	protect	himself;	his	genuine	fear	was	accepted	but	his	response	was	regarded	as	
unreasonable.		
	
It	should	be	noted	that	killings	in	the	course	of	a	dispute	or	fight	(usually	but	not	always	between	
men)	are	unfortunately	relatively	common	forms	of	homicide,	and	commonly	lead	to	a	conviction	
for	manslaughter	in	line	with	the	High	Court’s	analysis	in	R	v	Wilson	(1992).	In	the	absence	of	
proof	of	intention	to	kill	or	cause	grievous	bodily	harm,	or	recklessness	as	to	death/gbh—often	
difficult	 to	 show	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 fight—manslaughter	 can	 be	 an	 appropriate	 outcome	 and	
carries	the	same	maximum	penalty	as	defensive	homicide:	20	years	imprisonment.	
	
This	was	not	recognised	in	the	debates	leading	up	to	the	abolition	of	defensive	homicide	(cf.	Fitz‐
Gibbon	2015:	135).	However,	a	separate	discourse	developed	around	these	‘one	punch’	killings	
which	 had	 its	 own	 political	 trajectory	 (unrelated	 to	 the	 present	 discussion	 but	 discussed	
elsewhere)	(see,	for	example,	Quilter	2014).	
	
The	decision	to	abolish	defensive	homicide	was,	therefore,	highly	controversial,	one	fuelled	by	
what	Ulbrick	et	al.	(2016:	24)	observe	was	‘a	populist,	punitive	framework,	claiming	that	current	
laws	 were	 akin	 to	 “men	 getting	 away	 with	 murder”’,	 and	 inappropriately	 using	 defensive	
homicide	 for	killing	both	women	and	men.	 In	R	v	Middendorp	 [2010]	VSC	202,	 commentators	
emphasised	the	defendant’s	significantly	greater	size	compared	with	his	female	victim	and	the	
nature	of	his	violence	in	critiquing	the	decision.11	It	is	important	to	point	out	here	that	there	was	
little	call	 for	reform	about	the	cases	of	women	who	killed,	or	about	the	(lack	of)	use	of	expert	
evidence.12	The	question	therefore	being	asked	by	women’s	advocates	was	whether	the	criminal	
justice	system	had	in	practice	failed	to	take	account	of	the	ways	in	which	family	violence	could	
affect	a	woman	and	to	provide	an	explanatory	context	for	her	killing.	Indeed	the	question	was	
whether	 it	 was	 able	 to	 do	 so,	 given	 continuing	 dominant	 narratives	 about	 family	 violence	
(Kirkwood	et	al.	2013).	The	question	being	asked	by	 the	media	and	 law	and	order	advocates,	
however,	was	whether	defensive	homicide	had	been	an	inappropriate	excuse	for	male‐to‐male	
violence.13		
	
Men	who	killed	women	
The	reforms	in	2005	and	2014	addressed	the	killings	by	men	of	intimate	partners	by	abolishing	
the	provocation	defence	and,	nine	years	later,	the	offence	of	defensive	homicide.	Only	two	cases	
involving	male	 defendants	 relied	 directly	 on	 the	 reforms	 to	 argue	 that	 they	 killed	 to	 defend	
themselves	against	 the	violence	of	 their	 (female)	partner	 (Middendorp	 and	Bracken	 discussed	
above).	While	Middendorp	was	widely	criticised	as	noted,	the	decision	in	Bracken	was	generally	
seen	as	an	appropriate	result:	it	was	the	first	(and	only)	case	since	the	reforms	to	result	in	a	full	
acquittal	on	the	grounds	of	family	violence‐based	self‐defence.	This	was	significant	(aside	from	
the	statistically	unusual	gender	pattern)	for	the	use	made	of	expert	evidence	on	family	violence.	
	
The	provision	encouraging	expert	evidence	from	a	wider	range	of	experts	is	relatively	new,	and	
it	is	clearly	taking	time	for	legal	practitioners	to	make	full	use	of	it.	In	a	second	study	conducted	
by	DVRCV	and	Monash	University	researchers14	examining	legal	responses	to	men	charged	with	
murder	or	manslaughter	for	killing	a	female	intimate	partner	between	2005	and	2014,	36	men,	
or	 71	 percent	 (n=45)	 were	 convicted	 of	 murder	 after	 pleading	 guilty	 or	 following	 a	 trial	
(McKenzie	et	al.	2016:	43‐44).	However,	the	authors	also	found	a	continuing	use	of	narratives	
minimising	the	significance	of	any	background	involving	family	violence,	both	in	pleas	and	trials,	
and	at	sentencing.		
	
Common	themes	in	defence	narratives	in	this	study	included	lack	of	intent	(in	over	one‐third	of	
the	cases,	the	offender	claimed	the	death	was	the	result	of	an	accident);	that	the	offender	killed	
in	self‐defence	(two	men	argued	they	were	the	primary	victims	of	family	violence	and	a	further	
five	 men	 claimed	 the	 violence	 was	 ‘mutual’	 and	 they	 were	 defending	 themselves	 from	 the	
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deceased’s	aggressive	behaviour);	or	that	the	offender	had	a	mental	illness	or	impairment	at	the	
time	 of	 the	 homicide	 (in	 many	 cases	 the	 accused’s	 poor	 mental	 state	 was	 attributed	 to	 the	
relationship	breakdown	or	relationship	difficulties	more	generally)	(McKenzie	et	al.	2016:	90‐91,	
93‐94).		
	
Provocation	type	narratives	also	featured	in	the	cases	analysed:	18	of	the	men	alleged	they	either	
‘lost	control’,	‘snapped’,	‘saw	red’	or	suffered	an	‘inexplicable	surge	of	emotion’	in	the	moments	
prior	to	the	killing	(McKenzie	et	al.	2016:	96).	Moreover,	significant	narratives	that	emerged	in	
the	cases	presented	family	violence	‘as	primarily	physical	violence,	as	an	“anger	problem”,	as	a	
result	of	alcohol	and	drug	use,	or	a	mental	health	problem,	as	“mutual”	or	as	“out	of	character”’	
(McKenzie	et	al.	2016:	62).	Other	narratives	implied	an	expectation	that	the	victim	should	have	
left	 the	 perpetrator	 or	 sought	 legal	 protection.	 The	 authors	 concluded	 that,	 whilst	 these	
depictions	of	family	violence	are	admittedly	products	of	the	adversarial	nature	of	the	legal	system	
and	 legal	 rules	 in	 relation	 to	 proof	 and	 evidence,	 these	 narratives	 nonetheless	 draw	 on	 and	
maintain	community	misconceptions	about	family	violence	(McKenzie	et	al.	2016:	62).		
	
The	effect	of	the	reforms—and	changes	in	the	community	and	legal	attitudes	more	generally—
are	more	evident	in	judicial	sentencing	remarks.	While	provocation	was	abolished	as	a	defence	
in	2005,	it	continues	to	be	a	relevant	factor	that	the	judge	may	take	in	to	account	when	sentencing.	
Part	of	the	impetus	for	the	abolition	of	provocation	was	to	challenge	its	victim‐blaming	narratives	
and	the	defence’s	tendency	to	excuse	men’s	violence	against	intimate	partners.	In	a	study	of	post‐
provocation	sentencing	judgments	for	the	10‐year	period	since	the	reforms,	Hunter	and	Tyson	
(2016:	 28)	 found	 that	 concerns	 that	 the	 gendered	 assumptions	 underpinning	 provocation’s	
‘narratives	of	excuse’	 for	men’s	violence	would	simply	re‐emerge	at	sentencing	have	not	been	
borne	out.	Rather,	 they	 found	 that,	 although	 sentencing	narratives	 continue	 to	 reproduce	 the	
language	of	provocation	(for	example,	that	the	offender	lost	control),	some	judges	appear	to	be	
picking	up	on	the	spirit	of	the	reforms.	One	judge	in	particular	went	much	further	than	the	other	
judges	in	making	explicit	comments	affirming	women’s	rights	to	autonomy	and	equality,	in	line	
with	the	reforms.	Adopting	a	broad	understanding	of	family	violence	as	‘both	of	an	emotional	and	
physical	nature’,	King	J	in	R	v	Azizi	[2010]	VSC	112:	[18]	found	that	the	defendant	had	‘treated	her	
as	a	person	lacking	in	individual	rights,	and	a	person	that	must	do	what	she	was	told	to	do	by	you’	
(see	also	Hunter	and	Tyson	2017).		
	
Other	commentators	have	similarly	noted	that	judges	in	post‐reform	cases	can	be	seen	to	have	
adopted	the	gendered	critique	of	power	and	control	within	intimate	relations.	As	Freiberg,	Gelb	
and	Stewart	(2015:	65)	have	emphasised,	this	 is	a	pattern	in	judicial	remarks	which	has	been	
developing	since	at	least	the	early	2000s	so	is	not	solely	attributable	to	the	reforms—judges	are	
of	 course	 part	 of	 the	 community	 and	 influenced	 by	 changing	 values—but	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	
reforms	have	also	been	educative.	There	has	also	been	judicial	and	practitioner	training	on	family	
violence	and	its	dynamics,	at	least	in	Victoria	(Judicial	College	of	Victoria	2016),	which	would	also	
be	having	an	impact.	
	
Conclusion	
Have	the	Victorian	reforms	to	homicide	defences	made	them	more	responsive	to	the	gendered	
critiques	outlined	here?	Nearly	30	years	ago,	Carol	Smart	(1989)	warned	feminist	researchers	
and	activists	not	to	be	seduced	by	the	promise	of	law	reform	to	change	gendered	relations.	More	
recently	Douglas	 (2012:	378)	reiterated	 that	 it	will	 take	 ‘more	 than	statute	reform’	 to	 change	
women’s	experiences	of	justice.	
	
Our	evaluation	of	the	2005	and	2014	Victorian	reforms	suggests	that	they	will	usefully	direct	and	
constrain	ways	of	incorporating	understandings	of	family	violence	in	homicide	trials.	They	make	
it	possible	for	current	evidence‐based	knowledge	of	family	violence	to	become	part	of	the	plea	
hearing	or	trial	decision‐making	for	female	defendants,	at	least.		
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They	also	represent	important	symbolic	statements	about	the	significance	of	family	violence	and	
its	role	in	homicides	in	intimate	relations.	They	spell	out	gendered	power	narratives	in	ways	that	
would	have	been	unthinkable—and	perhaps	unrecognisable—40	years	ago.	
	
The	 abolition	 of	 the	 defence	 of	 provocation	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 effective	 in	 removing	 that	
gendered	 defence	 narrative	 (although	 recent	 research	 identified	 remnants	 in	 some	 trials	 and	
pleas).	There	is	evidence	that	claims	by	men	to	have	‘snapped’	or	‘lost	control’	when	faced	with	a	
sexual	rejection	or	with	the	partner’s	infidelity	are	not	being	accepted	as	mitigation	at	the	time	of	
sentencing,	 with	 judges	 using	 the	 opportunity	 to	 denounce	 these	 assertions	 of	 masculine	
entitlement	(Freiberg,	Gelb	and	Stewart	2015:	143).	The	sentencing	judge	in	R	v	Neacsu	[2012]	
VSC	388:	[43],	for	example,	stated:	‘Your	wife	was	entitled	to	leave	you.	You	may	not	have	liked	
that,	but	she	had	the	right	to	do	so.’	
	
There	is	also	evidence	that	the	use	of	context	evidence	may	be	developing,	and	with	it	the	likely	
educative	 effect	 of	 such	 information	 about	 the	 occurrence	 and	 impact	 of	 family	 violence	 on	
women’s	responses.	Whether	the	reforms	will,	 in	the	short	term,	change	the	daily	practices	of	
lawyers	 and	 judges	 is	 less	 clear.	 As	 some	 commentators	 have	 observed	 in	 this	 area,	 there	 is	
undoubtedly	a	need	for	‘comprehensive,	consistent,	and	ongoing	training’	for	legal	professionals	
to	combat	the	common	myths	about	and	barriers	to	disclosing	family	violence,	including	how	the	
use	of	expert	evidence	may	assist	in	support	of	a	defence	of	self‐defence	(Tyson	et	al.	2015:	92).		
	
Most	 reforms	 aimed	 at	 addressing	 social	 inequalities	 require	 broader	 social	 as	 well	 as	 legal	
change,	and	many	fail	because	they	are	imposed	on	an	unreceptive	audience.	It	may	be	that	the	
reforms	to	homicide	defences	are	finally	coming	at	a	good	time,	when	family	violence	is	high	on	
the	community	agenda.	Whether	they	can	produce	fundamental	change	in	legal	procedure	and	
narratives	remains	to	be	seen.	
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1	This	is	known	as	‘substantial	impairment	by	abnormality	of	mind’	in	NSW:	s	23A	Crimes	Act	1900	(NSW).	
2	See	Osland v R  (1998) 197 CLR 316.	Evidence	of	BWS	was	accepted	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	South	Australia	 in	R	v	
Runjanjic	and	Kontinnen	1991	and	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	in	Lavallee v R (1990) 55 CCC (3d) 97 where	Wilson	J	
stated,	‘Expert	evidence	on	the	psychological	effect	of	battering	on	wives	and	common	law	partners	must,	it	seems	to	
me,	be	both	relevant	and	necessary	in	the	context	of	the	present	case	[of	a	wife	who	killed	her	violent	husband]’	
(Lavallee v R (1990) 55 CCC (3d) 97:	112).	
3	See	current	s	322J(1)	Crimes	Act	1958	(Vic).	
4	Referencing	the	2013	study	by	Kirkwood,	McKenzie	and	Tyson.	
5	Its application for the defence of duress is similarly spelt out in s 322P. 
6	Dr	Debbie	Kirkwood	and	Ms	Mandy	McKenzie	(DVRCV)	and	Dr	Danielle	Tyson	(Monash	University).	
7	The	authors	identified	eight	cases	where	women	killed	an	intimate	partner.	Of	these,	one	was	not	committed	for	trial.		
8	Commentators	have	noted,	for	example,	the	way	in	which	the	sentencing	of	Karen	Black,	on	her	plea	to	defensive	
homicide,	 framed	 the	non‐physical	 violence	 suffered	by	Black	as	 ‘limited’	 to	 threats,	 intimidation	and	so	on,	 and	
focussed	on	the	immediate	violence	rather	than	highlighting	the	evidence	of	a	prior	history	violence	and	its	effects	
over	time,	such	that	the	homicidal	response	was	seen	as	disproportionate	–	that	‘the	cumulative	violence	led	Black	to	
overreact’,	(ie	was	unreasonable)	rather	than	being	seen	as	a	context	in	which	she	might	have	reasonably	believed	it	
was	necessary	to	kill	to	defend	herself	(Douglas	2015:	102;	Kirkwood,	McKenzie	and	Tyson	2013:	20;	Tyson	et	al.	
2015:	10‐12).	
9	Osland v R (1998) 197 CLR 316:	[161],[167]	cited	in	Douglas	(2015:	95‐96).	Kirby	J	in	Osland¸	for	example,	was	critical	
of	BWS	evidence	but	commented	that	expert	evidence	about	‘the	general	dynamics	of	abusive	relationships’	would	
be	admissible	if	relevant	and	from	an	appropriately	qualified	expert	as	relationship	or	context	evidence.	
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10	Kirkwood,	McKenzie	and	Tyson	(2013:	44)	confirmed	Douglas’	analysis,	finding	that,	‘[i]n	the	cases	that	we	analysed,	
none	of	the	women’s	circumstances	met	this	benchmark,	and	none	successfully	argued	self‐defence.	The	authors	also	
observe	that:	 ‘All	the	women	who	have	killed	their	 intimate	partners	since	the	2005	reforms	have	done	so	in	the	
context	of	family	violence.	While	it	may	not	always	be	the	case	that	women	who	kill	in	response	to	family	violence	
acted	in	self‐defence,	it	is	concerning	that	none	of	the	women	whose	cases	were	analysed	were	acquitted	on	the	basis	
of	self‐defence’	noting	the	apparent	problem	of	the	‘benchmark’	hurdle	(Kirkwood,	McKenzie	and	Tyson	2013:	44,	
citing	Douglas	2012:	377).	
11	Leader‐Elliott	concludes	that	the	decision	was	‘exceptional’,	an	outlier	(2015:	171).	
12	An	exception	is	Elder	and	Lee	2014.	
13	 As	mentioned	 earlier,	 these	 cases	would	 probably	 have	 been	 treated	 as	manslaughter,	with	 the	 same	 potential	
penalty.	This	point	was	not,	however,	taken	up	in	the	media	argument.	See,	for	example,	Hunt	2013.	
14	 Dr	Debbie	 Kirkwood	 and	Ms	Mandy	McKenzie	 (DVRCV)	 and	Dr	Danielle	 Tyson	 and	 Professor	 Bronwyn	Naylor	
(Monash	University).	
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